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1.  Introduction.
In this paper we look at price behavior in an economy undergoing dramatic changes. The
changes create a natural experiment which allows us to address several interesting questions.
How quickly do people learn?  How fast does the economy converge to long-run equilibrium? 
What economic mechanisms lead to the convergence? What are the dynamics of convergence?
The natural experiment is Poland’s big-bang transition to a market economy
1. In August
1989 the opposition unexpectedly won the general election; the new government was formed in
September. A package of radical economic reforms was prepared during the next couple of
months and introduced on January 1, 1990. The planned system was abolished and the
groundwork for a market economy was established creating, virtually overnight, an entirely new
economic environment.
We study the behavior of price dispersion during the first seven years following the big-
bang, using a large, disaggregated data set.  Before 1990 price dispersion was minimal as
uniform prices were set by either the central planner or by state firms
2. The freeing of prices in
January 1990 resulted in large differences in prices across stores and geographical regions.
Three types of agents are involved in the natural experiment: a shopkeeper, a customer
and an entrepreneur. The shopkeeper used to receive insufficient supplies, which she would sell
at predetermined prices. All of a sudden she is able to set prices; also, shortages rapidly
disappear. Over a short period of time the shopkeeper goes from being a distributor of scarce
commodities to being a profit maximizer. The customer used to search for availability of goods,
                                                
1See Sachs (1993) for a description and analysis of the reforms.
2 Differences arose only when goods were sold in unregulated private markets; the
volume of these transactions was small.2
as most products were in short supply. Now he is able to buy the goods he wants but prices vary
across stores. This creates incentives to search for the best price. The entrepreneur used to be a
shady character, who would bribe shopkeepers to buy goods which were in short supply and sell
them to street sellers. Now shortages disappear but new opportunities for profit arise: prices
differ across regions. She now establishes trading networks to buy goods at the wholesale level in
cheap regions and sell them in expensive ones, arbitraging the price differences.
This short description explains why the period period following the big-bang transition
can be viewed as a natural experiment in which, all of a sudden, economic agents are provided
with opportunities to maximize profits and to search for the best price (as opposed to search for
availability).
Both intramarket price dispersion - differences in price levels for a given good between
stores in a region, and intermarket price dispersion - differences in price levels for a given good
across regions - are initially large but rapidly fall. The standard explanation is the well-
documented relationship between dispersion and inflation and inflation variability. These
variables explain only part of the changes in dispersion.
The rest of the initial decline in dispersion is attributed to learning how to set prices in the
new environment. Learning is very fast: within a year dispersion reaches long-run values for a
vast majority of goods in our sample. Firms engage in active learning: in markets in which search
is intensive, there are more price changes per store (until the end of the first stage of transition)
than in markets with little search.
We find evidence that search for the best price determines the behavior of intramarket
price dispersion over time. Intermarket dispersion is determined by arbitrage: over time intra- as3
well as intermarket dispersion decline more for tradable goods than for nontradables.
Furthermore, the ratio of intra- to intermarket dispersion rises more for tradable than for
nontradable goods.
The dynamics of convergence are interesting.  The initial decline in the intra- and
intermarket dispersion overshoots their long-run values.  A possible explanation is as follows. 
As agents’ information about price distribution is limited, search and arbitrage activities react to
the decline in price dispersion with a delay.  As incentives fall, search and arbitrage become,
eventually, less active and price dispersion rises above long-run average.
The initial decline in intramarket dispersion is faster than in intermarket dispersion, and
ends sooner; overall intermarket dispersion declines more. The reason is that arbitrage is a more
difficult activity to organize, but economic incentives are larger.
Overall agents respond to new opportunities by acting precisely as economic theory
predicts they would.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we briefly review theoretical issues
and existing empirical evidence. Data are described in section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the
behavior of intramarket and intermarket price dispersions over time. In section 5 we discuss
various explanations of the observed behavior of dispersion. The last section concludes.
2. Theory and Empirical Evidence.
There are four basic reasons for prices to differ at the individual level. The first is due to
the obvious factors affecting local cost, supply and demand conditions. If goods are locally
produced, costs may vary across locations. For goods that are not locally produced, prices vary4
due to differences in transportation costs. Differences in costs arise also due to differences at the
wholesale and retail level (for example labor costs, rents or local taxes). Finally, there are
differences in competition at the wholesale and retail level as well as differences in search
patterns by customers. The first three factors affect mainly intermarket dispersion; the last affects
both inter and intramarket dispersion.
The second reason is due to nominal rigidities at the individual level. The most popular
explanation of these rigidities is the menu cost approach, started by Barro (1972) and developed
by Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983) and others. The basic menu cost model (Sheshinski and
Weiss, 1977) implies that, as the expected rate of inflation increases, the size of nominal price
changes rises. If price changes within a region are not perfectly synchronized, or if stores are
heterogeneous, this implies higher intramarket dispersion.
3  Intermarket price dispersion would
rise if local price changes are not perfectly staggered and price change patterns differ across
markets.
The third reason is the Lucas’ (1982) aggregate/local confusion approach, which implies
that prices may differ due to different composition of local shocks as well as different history of
local shocks. The driving force is the inability of agents to distinguish between local and
aggregate shocks. Combined with different supply and demand elasticities and with different
degrees of persistence of local shocks (Barro, 1976, Cukierman, 1984), aggregate and local
shocks generate price differences between individual sellers. The local/aggregate confusion
                                                
3 Empirically, though, while price changes do appear to be staggered (Lach and Tsiddon,
1992 and 1996, Tommasi, 1993 and Fisher and Konieczny, 1999a) empirical studies find many
instances when the size of price changes falls as inflation increases (see Fisher and Konieczny,
1999b, for a review of empirical evidence).5
approach can explain both intra- and intermarket dispersion.
Finally, during a period of rapid economic changes, prices may differ across stores and
across regions as price setters, in the absence of a stable and well-understood environment,
pursue different pricing policies.
Regardless of the model, intramarket price dispersion creates incentives to search for the
lowest price. Search intensity depends on the importance of given product in consumer
expenditure, the value of a single purchase and the frequency of purchases. Search intensity, in
turn, affects price dispersion.
Intermarket price dispersion creates incentives for arbitrage. Arbitrage opportunities
depend on transportation costs, durability of goods, the competitive nature of the wholesale
market and on demand elasticity. The last reason is an important link between intra- and
intermarket price dispersion: elasticity of demand is higher in markets where search is more
intensive. Therefore we expect intra- and intermarket price dispersion to be correlated across
goods.
The empirical literature concentrated on the relationship between inflation and relative
price variability (see Mills (1927), Vining and Elwertowski (1976), Parks (1978), Fischer (1981),
 Danziger (1987), Domberger (1987), Van Hoomissen (1988) Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Parsley
(1996) and Debelle and Lamont (1997), among others). The general conclusion is that relative
price variability and price dispersion at the individual level are positively related to various
measures of inflation and of inflation variability.6
3. Description of the Data.
The analysis is based on two unique data sets. The first data set, which we use to
construct a measure of intramarket price dispersion, consists of price information on individual
products and services in individual stores in Poland during the period 1990-1996. The data were
collected by the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) in order to calculate the Consumer Price
Index. GUS obtains data on 1500-1800 products in 307 districts, with one seller (store, street
market, restaurant or service provider) per district (Bauc et al, 1996, p. 55). Out of this set we
have a sample of 58 goods in 47 stores (districts) each. The data comprise the complete set of
price information for four out of the 49 administrative provinces in Poland (Voivodships). We
selected the voivodships with the largest number of districts. Two are urban (Warsaw and
Katowice, with about 90% of population in towns); the other two are less urbanized (Olsztyn and
Lublin, with about 60% of population in towns). The number of districts in each voivodship is
14, 15, 10 and 8, respectively. There are 2-4 observations per month in 1990 and 1-3
observations a month in 1991-96, depending on the good. It is important to note that the recorded
prices are the actual transaction prices as sales, coupons or volume discounts are very rarely used,
and were virtually unknown in the first few years of transition. The sales tax (VAT) is included
in prices. The tax is the same in all regions but varies slightly across goods.
The second data set, which we use to construct a measure of intermarket price dispersion,
consists of the average price levels of the same 58 goods in each of the 49 Voivodships during
the same period. These data are available monthly. GUS obtains the averages by calculating
averages of prices recorded in individual stores in a given month. Therefore the average price
levels for the four voivodships are the averages of the data for the given month from the first data7
set.
In order to be included in our data, each good has to meet several criteria. We require that
it did not change during the period in question. We excluded goods and services with regulated
prices, and eliminated several products where there were many missing observations. Finally, we
wanted to have data on a variety of goods. This was difficult as a lot of goods have changed
following the collapse of the planned economy. In the end, out of the 58 goods, 38 are groceries
(20 perishable and 18 storable), 3 are cigarettes, 10 are manufactured products, 4 are sold in
cafeterias/cafes and 3 are services. The list of the goods and various product groupings is in
Appendices A and B.
One problem with the data is that we do not know the identity of the store where a price is
being sampled. The sampling procedure is as follows. Each Voivodship is divided into several
districts. One store is picked in each district. The instructions for price inspectors are to choose
the same store each time, but this is not enforced and changes of stores are not recorded. Changes
in stores may be caused by limited availability of goods, transformation in the retail sector
following the collapse of the planned system (for example ownership changes) or simply by the
inspector's decision.
The data start at the beginning of transition and cover a period of seven years from 1990
until 1996. Data from before 1990 are not comparable as the methodology of collecting data was
completely revamped in January 1990.8
4. Intra- and Intermarket Price Dispersion.
In this section we concentrate on the description of the intra- and intermarket price
dispersion over time.
4.1. Measures of Intra- and Intermarket Price Dispersion.
There are two measures of price dispersion used in the literature: the coefficient of
variation of price levels and the standard deviation of the rates of change of prices.
4 As we are
interested in consumer search and in arbitrage, the first measure is more appropriate. The main
motivation for search and arbitrage are differences in the level of prices of a given good between
stores. Variability of the rates of change of prices affects search through its effect on the
depreciation of search information, but this effect is secondary.  The second reason for using the
standard deviation in price levels is that there are changes in stores.  A change in a sampled store
affects the standard deviation of the rates of price change but, as long as the new store is drawn
from the same distribution, it has little effect on the within-sample dispersion of price levels.
To calculate the measure of intramarket price dispersion we have to use all the individual
price data since some observations are missing. This is done as follows. Define the price of good
i in store j in voivodship v at time t as P
jv
it . For the analysis of individual store data we first
calculate the measure of price dispersion within voivodship v, CV
v
it :
                                                
4The second measure was suggested by Parks (1978). It is used in most recent studies of
the relationship between inflation and price dispersion. Its advantage is that it eliminates store-
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it is the average price of good i across stores at time t in voivodship v and N
v
it  is the
number of stores with a (non-missing) price observation for good i in voivodship v at time t . The
measure of price dispersion, CVit , is the unweighted average of the four voivodship measures.
This approach assures that we have a sufficient number of data points for each good in each
period and is not sensitive to differences in price level across the four voivodships.
The measure of intermarket price dispersion, CV
v
it  , is constructed by calculating the
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where Pit is the average, over all 49 voivodships, of the price of good i at time t.
4.2. The Behavior of Price Dispersion Over Time.
In Figure 1 we show the behavior of the average intra- and intermarket price dispersion
over time.  It is evident that both fall very rapidly in the early stages of transition.  They reach a
minimum in October 1990 and increase until the beginning of 1991.  The subsequent changes are
small; there is a slow downward trend until 1993 and, at least for intramarket dispersion, a slow
upward trend from 1994 on.
The behavior of the average dispersion masks the varied behavior of dispersion for10
individual goods.
5  The behavior of intramarket price dispersion over time for some of the goods
is shown in Figure 2. The typical pattern is shown in the panel A of Figure 2, which graphs
dispersion for selected meat products. It is high initially and then rapidly declines. For goods in
panel A, within 6 to 9 months intramarket dispersion falls from about 0.2 to about 0.05. For most
goods, after the initial period of decline the value of intramarket dispersion stabilizes (with the
exception of services) and the trend differs from good to good. In many cases (a bit more than
half) dispersion increases over time but for almost all goods it remains much lower than in 1990.
The remaining panels of Figure 2 show various categories of goods. In most cases they
are selected to illustrate departures from the typical pattern. The dispersion of prices of specialty
breads (panel B, goods 18 and 20) varies significantly over time, while for good 19, which is the
standard loaf, is similar to the typical behavior illustrated in panel A. Panel C shows the behavior
of dispersion of cigarette prices (goods 56-58). Cigarette prices were regulated until 1994 and
differences in prices prior to 1994 were very small (prices differed as some stores were selling
old stock). Hence we show the dispersion starting in November 1993. Unlike for other goods, it
does not fall rapidly following the removal of controls. The dispersion of prices of goods bought
in a cafeteria/café (panel D, goods 49-51) as well as of services (panel E, goods 53-55) is much
higher than for meats and much more variable. While it falls initially, it quickly returns to the
levels observed in 1990. Finally, panel F shows the behavior of price dispersion of manufactured
goods. For big-ticket items (goods 39-41) and small-ticket items (goods 43-45) dispersion
                                                
5   Also, it is, in some respects, misleading. As we show later, intramarket dispersion falls
faster than intermarket dispersion; Figure 1 suggests the opposite is the case.  The reason is that
the average is dominated by outliers.11
follows the usual pattern, but it is much higher for the latter.
6
The behavior of intermarket price dispersion, shown in Figure 3, follows a similar pattern
of an initial rapid decline, followed by a period of much more stable values. There are several
differences. The initial decline is more gradual, occurs over a longer period of time, and
dispersion falls more than in the case of intramarket price dispersion. Moreover, increases in
dispersion in the later period are rare.
7
To verify these initial observations we regress the measures of dispersion on time and
time squared. All regressions are estimated using OLS with non-parametric consistent estimation
of standard errors, described by Newey and West (1994) and Andrews and Monahan (1992). This
is a non-parametric kernel method. We use a quadratic-spectral kernel as suggested in Andrews
(1991) and Andrews and Monahan (1992). We also use a prewhitening procedure suggested in
Andrews and Monahan (1992) and automatic lag selection described in Newey and West (1994).
We use this approach to estimate standard errors for two reasons. First, the Durbin-
Watson statistics indicate autocorelation of the error terms. Second, as our sample is not
balanced, the number of observations that we use to calculate the coefficients of variation varies
over time and across goods, causing heteroscedasticity. So standard errors calculated in the usual
manner are inconsistent.
We use OLS instead of some other, potentially more efficient estimation technique (for
                                                
6 Big-ticket items are a vacuum cleaner, a kitchen mixer and a bicycle; small-ticket items
are razor blades, toothpaste and shaving cream.
7 Intermarket variability is also less volatile. The reason is that, first, it is calculated from
voivodship averages of individual store prices and, second, some data are missing at the
individual level and so intramarket variability is sometimes calculated from a small number of
observations.12
example maximum likelihood estimation, assuming some particular form of autocorelation and
heteroscedasticity) because we don’t have a theory of the behavior of the stochastic components.
Hence any other method would have to be based on some ad hoc assumptions and could result in
inconsistent estimation of the parameters and their standard errors.
Regression results are in Table 1. We run the regressions for two subperiods: 1990 and
1992-96 (in the second case we added monthly dummies to the explanatory variables). The first
period is chosen because, as Figure 2 indicates, for most goods the initial period of rapid
dispersion decline ends within the first 12 months. The intuition for including the time squared
variable on the right hand side is that learning about optimal price setting and search should be
fast initially and would slow down over time, as agents figure out how to optimize their objective
functions in the new environment. Hence we expect the coefficient on time squared to be positive
during transition. The second subperiod is chosen to show the behavior of markets in the new
equilibrium (which need not be stationary). We exclude data from 1991 to make sure that, for all
goods, the first stage of transition is over by the beginning of the period included in the
regression. There are 55 regressions in each run. Cigarettes are excluded as prices were regulated
until 1994.
The results for intramarket price dispersion in 1990 are as expected. The coefficients on
time are negative for 44 goods. For 26 - about half of all goods - they are significant at the 5%
level. None of the positive coefficients is significant. The coefficients on time squared are
positive for 42 goods, and significant for 23. Only for one good (35 -halvah) is the coefficient on13
time squared negative and significant.
8
In the 1992-96 period the behavior of goods is much more varied. The most predominant
pattern is an increase at a decreasing rate; this pattern is exhibited by about 2/3 of the goods for
which the coefficients are significant. Changes are much slower than in the first year.
Regression results for intermarket dispersion exhibit a similar pattern. One difference
worth noticing is that, during the period 1992-1996, intermarket price dispersion increases slower
than intramarket dispersion (in fact, for 45% of the goods for which the average slope
9 is
significant, intermarket dispersion decreases).
The comparison of the regression results for the first year suggests that intramarket
dispersion falls more slowly, in the sense that the absolute value of the average slope of the trend
curve, as well as the coefficient on time, are smaller than intermarket dispersion.
10 This is further
 documented by regression results of the ratio of intramarket to intermarket dispersion over the
whole sample period, shown in the last column of Table 1, and by the data shown in Figure 9.
The typical pattern is that the ratio increases, at a decreasing rate. The coefficients are significant
at the 5% level for about half of the goods.
4.3. The Distribution of Prices.
How big is intramarket price dispersion? In Figure 4 we plot the lines for price
                                                
8 Halvah is the only good for which the coefficient on time is positive and significant at
the 10% level.
9 We define the average slope for a given good to be the average (over time) of the first
derivative with respect to time of the estimated model.
10  As discussed below, data for individual goods show the opposite is the case.14
observations that are at least 30%, 20% or 10% away from the average.
11 Dispersion is
substantial. The probability of finding a price at least 30% higher or at least 30% lower than the
average is 16% in January 1990. It declines rapidly to about 3% in November 1990 and fluctuates
around 3-4% for the rest of the sample period. The probability of finding a price at least 20%
higher or at least 20% lower than the average is 29% in January 1990, declines to about 9% in
October 1990 and fluctuates around 10% for the rest of the sample period.
The distribution of logs of prices is almost symmetric throughout the sample. Large
(above 20%) and small (below 10%) positive deviations from the mean are a bit more frequent
than the corresponding negative deviations. Changes in the distribution of prices are shown in
Figure 5. The distribution converges very rapidly to its long-run value: by June 1990 it is very
similar to the distribution in 1992-96. The distribution becomes more peaked, with thinner tails.
12
This means that very expensive and very cheap stores disappear. This is most likely due to
changes in pricing policies by shopkeepers, as bankruptcies were very rare during that period.
4.4. How Long is the First Stage of Transition?
A limitation of the regressions discussed in the previous subsection is that, in most cases,
the period covered by the regressions is longer than the initial period of the rapid decline in
dispersion (which varies significantly across goods)
13. A shorter regression period would reduce
the number of degrees of freedom and still would not solve the problem of heterogeneity of
                                                
11 The numbers are the differences of the natural logarithms of nominal prices from their
geometric average.
12 Kurtosis increases monotonically in the first six months of 1990.
13 Also, the functional form and parametric approach can lead to wrong inferences.15
goods. Therefore we supplement the analysis with simple statistics, shown in Table 2. They
allow us further to characterize the behavior of price dispersion over time.
We define the first stage of transition as the initial period during which dispersion
declines rapidly. The most interesting question is: how long is the first stage? To answer it we
need a criterion which would reliably pick up the end of the initial period. After examining the
data carefully we propose a simple one. The first stage of transition is assumed to end whenever
the current level of dispersion, as measured by CVit , falls below its averages in the next three, six
and twelve months. This approach avoids choosing, as the end of the initial period, a month in
which the dispersion is temporarily low, but allows the choice of a month which is followed by
small variations in dispersion.
14
The histogram of lengths of the first stage of the transition is in Figure 6. The first stage
of transition is shorter for intra- than for intermarket dispersion. The relevant statistics on
intramarket dispersion are shown in Table 2a and on intermarket price dispersion in Table 2b. On
the average, the first stage of transition for intramarket dispersion lasts 7 months, while the
decline of intermarket dispersion takes about 10.5 months. The decline is dramatic: intramarket
dispersion falls to 40% of its value in January 1990 while intermarket dispersion falls to 35% of
its January 1990 value.
15
The first stage ends the earliest for services (including goods purchased in cafeteria/café)
and for perishable foodstuffs. It should be noted that the decline in price dispersion for services is
                                                
14 We also used a heuristic criterion, whereby the end of the first stage of transition was
selected by examining data by hand. In most cases results are identical and averages are almost
the same so we do not report them.
15  Intramarket dispersion is the highest in January 1990 for 22 out of 55 goods;
intermarket dispersion is the highest for 32 goods.16
only temporary: dispersion returns to initial level within, at most, two years. It is actually higher
in 1992-96 than in 1990, unlike for the other goods.
The evidence on the speed of intra- versus intermarket transition differs from that in
Table 1. This is due to the fact that the regression period covers the initial decline as well as the
subsequent rebound in dispersion.
As already noted, the overall decline in intramarket price dispersion is smaller than the
decline in intermarket dispersion. While their values are initially similar, the former is larger in
the 1992-96 period for 50 out of the 55 goods.
16 On the average the value of intramarket
dispersion in 1992-96 is 55% of the value in January 1990 and 78 % of the average value in
1990; for intermarket dispersion the corresponding numbers are 39% and 65%.
4.5 Overshooting.
An interesting feature of the data set is what we call overshooting. The initial decline in
dispersion in the first stage of transition overshoots the average in 1992-96. It is followed by a
rapid increase above the 1992-96 average.
Overshooting is more pronounced for intra- than for intermarket dispersion. Columns 9
and 10 of Table 2 show the month and the value of the first local maximum of dispersion
following the end of the first stage of transition. The following statistics characterize
overshooting; the values for intermarket dispersion are in brackets. The value of intramarket
(intermarket) dispersion at the end of the first stage of transition is below the average in 1992-96
                                                
16 The five exceptions are the two cafeteria products (49 and 50), two meats (1 and 5) and
radiator coolant (48).17
for 49 (38) goods. It then increases rapidly, reaching the first local maximum, on the average,
within 1.8 (2.5) months. The average dispersion at the first local maximum is 54% (30%) higher
than at the end of the first stage of transition, and for 40 (38) products it is above the average in
1992-96.
17 We return to the issue of overshooting in the next section.
To summarize, price dispersion declines rapidly in the early stages of transition. The
decline proceeds at a faster pace for intramarket dispersion but ends earlier; intermarket
dispersion continues to fall and eventually declines significantly more than intermarket
dispersion does. The initial decline overshoots the long run value; this effect is more pronounced
for intramarket dispersion.
5.  Explaining the Behavior of Price Dispersion.
We now turn to explanations of the behavior of price dispersion over time and across goods.
We consider several possibilities. First, the behavior of both intra- and intermarket dispersion
may be due to the well-documented relationship between price dispersion and inflation as well as
inflation variability. Second, the initial rapid decline may be the result of price-setters learning
how to operate in the new environment. Third, changes in intramarket dispersion may be driven
by consumer search and by changes in the retail structure as market institutions become
established. Fourth, changes in intermarket dispersion may be the result of agents taking
                                                
17It should be noted that the criterion we use only assures that dispersion increases
following the end of the first stage of transition. Other aspects of the overshooting effect are not
the result of the chosen criterion.18
advantage of arbitrage possibilities.
18 To summarize the results, we reject the hypothesis that that
the first explanation can fully account for the initial decline of price dispersion and we find
evidence supporting the other three explanations.
5.1. Inflation, Inflation Variability and Price Dispersion.
Is the behavior of price dispersion solely the effect of changes in inflation and in inflation
variability? This is certainly possible. The graphs of CPI inflation and a measure of inflation
variability (described below) in Figure 7 show that those two series behave in a similar fashion to
price dispersion. To test this hypothesis we add measures of inflation and of inflation variability
to the regressions shown in Table 1. The estimated equations are:
t e a + + + + + + = MD t it it t a t a x a  a CV ad
2
4 3 var 2 1 0 (3)
where CVit is price dispersion of good i , a’s are the parameters to be estimated, Pit is the measure
of inflation (CPIt or own inflation of good i, INFit ) xvart is the measure of inflation variability, t
denotes time, dMD is the vector of monthly dummies (monthly dummies are not included in
regressions for period 02/90-06/91) and et is a stochastic component.
The results are in Table 3. In the first 4 columns we use the rate of change of CPI as a
measure of inflation for all goods. This approach is problematic when there are large relative
price changes (which is the case in our data); CPI may not measure the underlying inflation
                                                
18 Another possibility is that firms sell old stock at old prices and so dispersion is the
artifact of staggered deliveries of new stock (Diamond, 1991, provides an example of a market in
which repricing old stock was illegal). This explanation does not apply to goods which are priced
in the store: meats (1-8), eggs (9), live carp (10) and breads (18-20). The behaviour of price
dispersion for these goods, however, is similar to the behaviour of price dispersion for the
remaining foodstuffs.19
adequately. Therefore, in the last 4 columns of Table 3, we replace CPI with own inflation, i.e.
the rate of change of the national average price of the good in question. The proxy for inflation
variability is the standard deviation of inflation rates across the 55 goods (excluding cigarettes).
The regressions use the first 18 moths of data; there are 12 degrees of freedom as we cannot
calculate own inflation, or the inflation variability measure, for January 1990.
The additional variables do not alter the general pattern of dispersion behavior over time.
Coefficients on time and time squared are of the same sign as in regressions shown in Table 1.
They are smaller in absolute value and are less often significant. This is to be expected since both
inflation and inflation variability are correlated with time, as can be seen in Figure 7
19.
Conclusions presented above are drawn simply by looking at the estimated coefficients.
Figure 8 provides further, evidence that inflation and its variability do not fully explain the
behavior of price dispersion.  We run regression given by (3) on the entire sample (2/90-12/96)
and plot the average (across goods) of the following variable:
MD t it it it x a INF a CV y d a ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ var 2 1 0 - - - - = a (4)
The value of yi shows the behavior of price dispersion of good i after the effects of
inflation, of inflation variability, seasonal effects and differences between goods have been
controlled for.  The familiar pattern of an initial rapid decline followed by smaller changes later
on, as well as a larger decline in intermarket dispersion, is evident.
20
                                                
19 The correlation between time and CPI inflation is -0.50; between time and inflation
variability is -0.56, the average correlation between time and own inflation is -0.26
20 The changes in dispersion in Figure 8 are smaller than those in unadjusted data (see
Figure 1).  Note, however, that inflation and its variability are correlated with the economic
forces (learning, search and arbitrage) to which we attribute changes in dispersion.20
Regression results in Table 4 indicate that the variability of inflation has a strong positive
effect on price dispersion, especially in the later period. The effect of the two measures of
inflation is mixed. As expected, own inflation has a stronger effect than CPI, but for many goods
the coefficient is of the opposite sign than predicted; indeed, in the case of own inflation, its
effect on intermarket dispersion in the later period is more often significantly negative than
significantly positive.
Those results appear inconsistent with existing empirical evidence. They are, however,
consistent with price behavior in an economy in which price dispersion is due to staggered price
adjustment by firms which face menu costs. The intuition is as follows. Consider a market in
which all firms are identical and stagger price changes uniformly over time, as in Caplin and
Spulber (1987). A decrease in the rate of inflation will prompt firms whose real prices are low to
adjust their nominal prices upwards. This changes the ordering of firms with respect to their real
price but, as long as most firms leave their prices unchanged, has little effect on our measure of
dispersion.
21
This issue does not arise in most empirical work as the typical measure of dispersion is
the standard deviation of the rates of change of prices, rather than levels. Using the first data set,
in a companion paper (Konieczny and Skrzypacz, 1999), we find that the effect of own inflation
on the standard deviation of rates of price change is significant and positive.
22 Hence the results
are an artifact of the dispersion measure used.
                                                
21 This argument applies to intramarket price dispersion. It would hold for intermarket
price dispersion as well if price changes were synchronized within voivodships and staggered
across voivodships. Evidence reported in section 5.3 suggests this is not the case.
22 Lach and Tsiddon (1992) also note that the effect of inflation on the dispersion of rates
of change is much stronger than on the dispersion of price levels.21
Apart from regression results, there are three additional arguments against the hypothesis
that inflation and its variability fully explain the behavior of price dispersion. First, in 1992-96
the inflation rate and inflation variability both fall while price dispersion increases for many
goods. Second, inflation and inflation variability cannot explain the overshooting pattern
discussed in section 4.5. Third, these variables do not explain the timing (and its variability
across goods) of the end of the first stage of transition.
The fact that the behavior of price dispersion cannot be explained by the behavior of
aggregate variables is not surprising. Standard models of price setting, in particular the menu cost
and the Lucas’ models, deal with stationary, or predictably nonstationary, environments.
Economists do not have much experience with modeling behavior under conditions of radical,
unpredictable change.
5.2. Learning.
The big-bang transition in Poland created an entirely new, constantly changing
environment. Economic agents faced both aggregate and local uncertainty. First and foremost, it
was far from certain that the reform process would succeed. In retrospect, we know that the
transition to a market economy produces a variety of results and that the Polish experience is an
outlier (it is the first country to reach its pre-reform level of GDP). So it is obvious that
optimizing agents approached the reform process with a degree of skepticism. Monetary and
fiscal policy, set by a new government in an unprecedented environment, produced further
sources of aggregate uncertainty.
From the point of view of this paper local uncertainty is most important. Consider a22
shopkeeper who decides what price to charge for her goods. Her optimal price depends on the
usual things: inflation, costs, demand and their expected behavior over time. Optimal pricing
models depend crucially on the ability of agents to form expectations about the relevant
variables. Now, however, these variables are impossible to predict. The inflation rate is driven by
an entirely new regime. Supply arrangements are freed from the planned-economy straightjacket
and so commercial relations are fluid. Not only does she not know what wholesale prices will be
but she faces uncertainty about the sources of supply as well. Past information on price elasticity
of demand is useless for several reasons. In the past, markets often did not clear as prices were
dictated by planners, so the elasticity was usually zero. Also, prices did not differ between stores
so consumer search for the best price is a new phenomenon. Finally, strategic considerations
were irrelevant. Now her prices depend on prices set at other stores, which face the same
uncertainty and whose decisions are difficult, if not impossible, to predict. The whole
arrangement is akin to Keynes’ beauty contest problem, with one modification: the participants
are from a newly discovered, and distinct, tribe.
Under those circumstances agents can be expected to start by using simple rules of
thumb. One possibility is a constant markup. We do not have data on wholesale prices by
location but it is unlikely that the dispersion is due to differences in wholesale prices across
districts. The voivodships are small (in particular Warsaw, which consists of the city and a small
surrounding area) and initial dispersion is large even for goods which have a single national
producer (goods 39-46) and, presumably, few distributors.
23
                                                
23 For 6 out of the 8 single-producer goods the maximum dispersion in Warsaw is higher
than the numbers reported in table 2.23
It is, of course, possible that stores use a constant markup, but the value of the markup
differs across stores. What is more likely is that different stores use different rules and it is not
surprising that, given the informational problems, these rules lead, initially, to widely different
prices. We attribute the behavior of price dispersion to learning by price setters, both about the
new task of profit maximization and about the new environment. Over time information is
acquired (either passively or by active manipulation of prices) and the environment becomes
more predictable. As a consequence, their decisions become more similar.
What is remarkable is the speed with which agents learn how to set prices. For most
goods the initial period of rapid dispersion decline is over by July 1990; for 3/4 of goods it is
over by October 1990. As Figure 5 indicates, by the end of June the distribution of prices is very
similar to its long run (1992-96) shape. We can safely conclude that, for a vast majority of goods,
the initial stage of transition ends within the first year.
The behavior of cigarette prices provides another argument that learning is responsible for
the evolution of price dispersion over time. By the time price controls on cigarettes are
eliminated (1994) agents are familiar with the environment and know how their products should
be priced. Hence there is no initial decline of dispersion; in fact, the behavior of cigarette prices
at the beginning of 1994 is no different than the behavior in a later period, as can be seen in
Figure 2.
The data allow us to make some inferences about the learning process. A price setter can
passively observe the behavior of demand as the real price falls over time, or can actively
experiment by changing the nominal price. In column 7a of Table 2a we show the average24
number of price changes per store to the end of the first stage of transition.
24 The correlation
between the length of time to the end of transition and the number of changes is about 0.65; if we
eliminate outliers (the five goods with the longest transition - at least 17 months, and the five
goods with the shortest transition - 2 months) the correlation is 0.46. This indicates that firms use
both passive and active approaches to learn the pricing mechanism.
As we argue below, search for the best price is responsible for the differences across
goods. In table 2a we show the averages for goods grouped by search considerations; the
description of the categories is in the next subsection. The more active is search, the more elastic
is demand. Hence we expect that, as the effect of a suboptimal price on profits is large, learning
will be more active. Indeed, with the exception of the grouping based on the amount spent on
single purchase, the more active is search the higher is the average number of price changes per
store. On the other hand, as can be seen in Table 2a, search considerations do not have much
impact on the length of time to the end of transition (if outliers are eliminated, the average time
for the grouping based on the amount spent on single purchase is between 4.7 and 6.2 months;
for the remaining groupings it is between 5.1 and 5.7 months).
5.3. Consumer Search and Price Dispersion.
We now ask whether the behavior of intramarket price dispersion is consistent with
                                                
24 As there are missing observations, we calculate it as follows. For a given good, let lj
denote the number of price changes in store j before the month in which the first stage of
transition ends, mj denote the number of observations in which the price could change (ie. the
number of cases in which there are observations in two consecutive periods) and nj denote the
maximum value of mj (ie. when there are no missing observations). Then the average number of
price changes per store is the average of lj × nj /mj .25
consumer search for the lowest price. Consumer search is not a new phenomenon in Poland:
consumers were very experienced searchers prior to the introduction of market reforms in 1990.
It is the nature of search that changed. Under central planning search was for availability, as
many goods were in short supply. One consequence of market reforms was the fast elimination of
shortages (see, for example, Sachs, 1993). The combination of experienced searchers with the
new phenomenon of price dispersion created conditions of intensive search for the lowest price.
One way of testing this hypothesis is to regress dispersion on expenditure shares.
Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain data on expenditure shares of the goods in our data set.
In the absence of this information we have to resort to providing summary statistics for various
groups of goods. We expect dispersion to fall to a lower value, and perhaps fall faster, for
products which either constitute a large portion of household expenditure or are expensive
relative to other items. CV measures dispersion in units of the product; so a value of 10% is more
important for the purchase of a bicycle than for the purchase of jam. We expect prices to vary
more for heterogeneous goods than for homogenous goods. As far as durable and perishable
foodstuffs are concerned, there are no clear predictions. There are 2 effects. Demand for durable
goods may be more elastic, as consumer can buy large amounts for later use (something they
used to do a lot when goods were in short supply). On the other hand, avoiding setting price
which is too high is more important in case of perishable foodstuffs. Overall it is difficult to say
how durability affects price dispersion.
Figure 2 provides evidence that search does matter. Panel F shows the behavior of price
dispersion of manufactured goods. The relevant data are in Table 2a. For large, expensive items
(39 - vacuum cleaner, 40 - kitchen mixer, 41 - bicycle) the decline in dispersion is faster, and26
dispersion falls to a much lower level, than for small, inexpensive items (43 - razor blades, 44 -
toothpaste, 45 - shaving cream). Among breads (panel B), dispersion falls faster, and to a lower
level, for the standard loaf (19) than for specialty breads. The average dispersion in 1992-96 is
the lowest for meats, dairy products, baby formula, flour, sugar and large-ticket manufactured
goods. All those foodstuffs constitute a large portion of household expenditure.
25 Prices differ
more (and dispersion does not tend to fall) for heterogeneous items where quality differs: goods
bought in cafeteria/café (panel D) and for services (panel E). Price dispersion for durable
foodstuffs is greater than the dispersion for perishable foodstuffs and falls slower. The reason is
that, with some exceptions (sugar, flour as well as fish) perishable foodstuffs in our sample are
more important in household expenditure.
To analyze search more systematically, we grouped the goods on the basis of
characteristics which are relevant for search. There are four groupings. Three are the standard
ones: the importance in household expenditure (conditional on the household buying the good),
search (purchase) frequency
26 and the amount spent on a single purchase. We also add a
subjective measure of search intensity, which tries to aggregate the factors relevant for search -
the three discussed above and the omitted factors which do not fall neatly into one of the three
categories.
27 It reflects our opinion how much effort a typical consumer puts into finding the best
                                                
25  It should be noted that what is important is the share of a given product in the
expenditure of households which buy it. For example, baby formula may be a small portion of
total household expenditures, but it is important for people with small children.
26 Frequency matters as it affects the value of information acquired in earlier search.
27 For example, live carp is usually bought for Christmas or Easter holidays; its weight in
expenditure, the frequency of purchases and the amount spent on a single purchase are low, but
search for the best price is intensive.27
price for the good.  The classification of products by the four groupings is in Appendix B.
As we do not have data on the weight of the goods in household expenditure, the
groupings are arbitrary. We grouped the goods independently and then reconciled the rankings.
To minimize arbitrariness, for each grouping goods are divided into three categories. The
groupings do measure different aspects of search, as can be seen in Table 4 which shows the
correlation coefficients between the four classifications.
The results are in Tables 2a (intramarket dispersion) and 2b (intermarket dispersion). The
results for the level of dispersion, despite the arbitrary nature of the rankings, are striking. We
compare the average levels of dispersion at three exogenous moments of time (January 1990,
average in 1990, average in 1992-96 - columns 3-5), two endogenous moments of time (value at
the end of the first stage of transition, value at the first subsequent maximum - columns 8 and 10)
as well as the values of the overall minimum and maximum - columns 1 and 2.
If search for the best price matters, we expect intramarket dispersion to be the lowest for
goods which: are the most important in household expenditure, are bought most frequently, are
most expensive, and are subject of the most intensive search. We expect the goods with the
highest dispersion to have the opposite characteristics.
There are 84 possible pairwise orderings (4 groupings, with 3 categories in each, times 7).
Of those, 71 (85%) orderings are as predicted by the search model. Of the remaining 13, 9 are
due to a single outlier. There are only five products classified as having the highest amount spent
on a single purchase: the four big-ticket manufactured products (39-42) and one service (floor
varnishing - 54). As price dispersion of floor varnishing is much larger than that of the big-ticket
products, it dominates the category. If it is excluded, all orderings in that grouping are as28
predicted; overall 80 (or 95%) of orderings are as predicted. Moreover, the dispersion in the
highest category in each grouping is always the smallest. The results for intermarket price
dispersion are similar to those for intramarket dispersion.
If search determines the behavior of price dispersion in the first stage of transition, the
decline in dispersion should be larger in cities as opportunities for search are greater. We cannot
compare individual regions as we do not know how urbanized they are. We can, however,
compare the behavior of dispersion among voivodships. There are two distinct groups. Two out
of the four voivodships for which we have individual data, Warsaw and Katowice, are
predominantly urban: in 1992 about 88% of population lived in towns (GUS, 1993). In the other
two (Olsztyn and Lublin) the proportion of urban population was 60%. We compare the average
(across goods) dispersion in both groups. In January 1990 the average dispersion in the urban
voivodships is 3.4% higher than in the remaining two. The difference reaches its peak value of
4.3% in June 1996 and drops rapidly to a minimum of -0.3% in January 1991. To put those
numbers in perspective assume that the entire difference is due to the difference in urbanization
rates. Under this assumption, between January 1990 and January 1991 the dispersion in a
hypothetical region which is 100% urban would have fallen by about 10% relative to the
dispersion in a hypothetical region which is 100% rural.
5.4.  Overshooting.
Overshooting provides further evidence that search matters. The evidence is discussed in
section 4.5.  It should be noted that overshooting is not due to the behavior of aggregate
variables.  As can be seen in Figure 7, both CPI inflation and inflation variability exhibit a29
pattern similar to overshooting: the former reaches a local maximum in January 1991, the latter
in December 1990.  This peak (and the preceding through) do not coincide with the similar
behavior for individual goods. For intramarket dispersion the first local maximum following the
end of the first stage of transition is in January 1991 for only 2 out of 55 goods, and within two
months of January 1991 for only 11 goods.  For intermarket dispersion the first local maximum is
in December 1990 for 7 goods and within two months of December 1990 for 16 goods (see
column 9 of Table 2).
Our proposed explanation of the overshooting is as follows. Over time price dispersion
declines.  Given that search is costly, each consumer samples only a finite number of stores and
notices the decline in price dispersion with some delay.  Hence, even after price dispersion has
declined, search is intensive. This explains why dispersion at the end of the first stage of
transition overshoots long-run values. Eventually, consumers realize the distribution of prices has
changed and search incentives have fallen.  Search effort is reduced.  Firms, in turn, notice the
decline in demand elasticity with some delay.  When they do, they allow prices to vary more
from those charged by their competitors and, as a result, dispersion increases.
28
This rise in dispersion following the end of the first stage of transition should be the
largest for goods where search is time consuming and the smallest for goods where search is
easy. The search characteristic which is the most relevant is search frequency. If a good is
purchased rarely, new search has to start each time from scratch, and so it is time consuming. On
the other hand, for goods which are purchased frequently, search information does not deteriorate
fast and so search is inexpensive. Indeed, as can be seen from columns 8 and 10 of Table 2a, the
                                                
28 We are grateful to John Leach for suggesting this interpretation.30
increase in dispersion from the end of the first stage of transition to the first subsequent
maximum is the largest for goods purchased rarely, and smallest for goods purchased frequently.
This is also the case for intermarket dispersion.
29
5.5. Arbitrage.
We now turn to the analysis of the behavior of intermarket price dispersion.
Before we analyze those issues, we need to address a potential problem with our data. In
section 4 we documented the large level, and big changes, of intermarket dispersion of prices. It
is possible that this is the artifact of the small number of observations in each voivodship.
30 The
intuition is as follows. Price changes are large: the average price increase (decrease) is between
33% (14%) in 1990 and 9% (8%) in 1996 (1995). With a small number of observations, a
voivodship in which a store has just increased price will have a high price level. Hence
intermarket dispersion may be due to staggering of price changes across voivodships.
If that is the case, the ordering of voivodships with respect to their price levels should
change all the time. Hence the correlation between the orderings in adjacent periods should be
close to zero. To test this hypothesis we compute, for each good, the ranks of prices for each
voivodship in each period. The data cover 58 goods and 84 periods. To make sense of this
                                                                                                                                                            
29  Note that the time between the end of the first stage of transition and the first local
maximum following it differs little across the frequency of purchase classification.  As discussed
above, this is also true of the time to the end of the first stage of transition.
30 There are 307 districts (stores) in 49 voivodships, so that the average number of
observations in a voivodship is about 6. Also, many data are missing: the proportion of missing
data in the four voivodships for which we have store-level information is between 30% in 1990
and 10% in 1996.31
information, for each period we calculate the average of the ranks across goods. Then we
compute correlations of the average ranks between two adjacent periods and yearly averages of
the correlations. They vary between 0.461 in 1990 and 0.715 in 1995. In few cases individual
correlations are close to zero and so we conclude that the intermarket dispersion is not an artifact
of the small number of observations.
Economic changes started with the big-bang transition create opportunities for arbitrage.
In a planned economy, the opportunities for arbitrage are limited as the planner dictates the
geographic distribution of goods as well as sources of supply. Market reforms, started with the
big-bang transition, allow stores to choose their suppliers. Together with the elimination of
shortages, this process leads to a reduction in price dispersion within, and across voivodships. 
As can be seen in Tables 2a and 2b, both intra- and intermarket dispersions decline more for
tradable goods: manufactured products, durable goods than for nontradable goods: breads, goods
sold in cafeteria- café and services (see columns 4 and 5).
The comparison of interregional price dispersion with intraregional price dispersion is a
topic of interest in international trade literature. Engel and Rogers (1999) compare dispersion of
the rates of change of a given product aggregate between cities with the dispersion of the rates of
change of various aggregates across cities. They find that the Law of One Price - or more
accurately, Relative Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)- does not hold. One striking result is that the
departures from Relative PPP are greater for aggregates of traded goods than for aggregates of
nontraded goods.32
In Figure 9 we plot the ratio of intramarket to intermarket dispersion for all goods.
31
Initially, intramarket price dispersion is about the same as intermarket dispersion. The ratio
slowly increases and by 1992 intramarket dispersion is about 40% higher than intermarket
dispersion. So our data appear to support Engel and Rogers’ (1999) findings. When we look at
various categories of goods a different picture emerges. As we are concerned with the dispersion
of price levels, our data allow us to analyze departures from the Absolute PPP, not the Relative
PPP. If Absolute PPP holds, the ratio of intra- to intermarket price dispersion should be low for
traded goods and high for non-traded goods. The most tradable group in our sample are goods
39-46. Each of those goods has a single producer, making arbitrage particularly easy. The non-
traded products are 49-52 (goods purchased in a cafeteria or café), 53-55 (services) and 18-20
(breads). Also, durable foodstuffs are easier to trade than perishable foodstuffs. The ratios of
intra- to intermarket dispersion for those groups are plotted in Figure 9. Their behavior is
consistent with active arbitrage for traded goods and less active (or absence of) arbitrage for non-
traded goods.
5.6. A Comparison of the Behavior of Intra-and Intermarket Dispersion.
Finally, we turn to explaining the differences and similarities of the behavior of intra- and
intermarket price dispersion. As discussed above, for intramarket dispersion the initial decline
proceeds at a faster pace and the end of the first stage of transition happens earlier (see Figure 6),
but the overall decline is smaller than for intermarket dispersion (see, for example, the last
                                                
31All ratios in Figure 9 are calculated as the average ratio for all goods (rather than the
ratio of the averages).33
column of Table 1 or Figure 9). We interpret these differences as follows. Compared to the
search for the best price, arbitrage is a more difficult activity to set up. Finding price differences
is more difficult across than within regions; reliable sources of (cheap) supply as well as demand
(in expensive regions) have to be found, commercial relations have to be established,
transportation arranged, etc. All this takes time, and so the initial decline in intermarket
dispersion is slower.
On the other hand, the potential monetary benefit from arbitrage is obviously larger than
from the search for the best price. Hence active arbitrage proceeds even when price differences
do not justify the search effort.
Apart from these quantitative differences, a striking feature in the data is the qualitative
similarity in the behavior of intra- and intermarket dispersion. We attribute this to the dominant
role of search for the best price. In markets in which search is intensive demand elasticity is high.
This creates large incentives for active arbitrage within, as well as across, regions. As a result, 
both intra- and intermarket dispersions are small.
6. Conclusions.
When the big-bang reform turns the economic environment inside out, agents learn
gradually how to behave in this natural experiment. Store managers (or owners) face, for the first
time, the decision to set prices.  They initially respond by choosing widely dispersed prices.
Consumers respond by searching for the best price, which is more financially (if not
psychologically) rewarding than searching for availability they had to endure under central
planning. Entrepreneurs respond by arbitraging price differences between regions. These forces34
move the economy rapidly towards the long-run equilibrium. The remarkable feature of the
process is that economic agents respond to new opportunities by acting precisely as economic
theory predicts.35
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Appendix A. List of goods:
1. Back bacon “Sopocka”, 1kg; 2. Sausage “Krakowska sucha", 1 kg; 3. Sausage “Mysliwska
sucha”, 1 kg; 4. Sausage “Krakowska parzona”, 1kg; 5. Sausage “Zwyczajna”, 1kg; 6. Pork
wieners, 1 kg; 7. Sausage “Torunska”, 1 kg; 8. Sausage “Zywiecka”, 1 kg; 9. Eggs, each; 10.
Carp, live, 1 kg; 11. Herring, salted, 1 kg; 12. Sprats, smoked, 1 kg;; 13. Cheese “Gouda”, 1 kg;
14. Cheese “Edamski”, 1 kg; 15. Butter, 82.5% fat, 250g; 16. Margarine “Palma”, 250g; 17.
Veggie butter, 250g tub; 18. Rye bread, 1 kg; 19. Bread “Baltonowski”, 1 kg; 20. Bread
“Wiejski”, 1 kg; 21. Powdered baby formula, 500g. 22. Flour “Tortowa”, 1 kg; 23. Flour
“Krupczatka”, 1 kg; 24. Flour “Poznanska”, 1 kg; 25. Pearl barley “Mazurska”, 1 kg; 26. Sugar,
1 kg; 27. Plum butter, 460g jar; 28. Jam, blackcurrant, 460g jar; 29. Apple juice, 1 l box; 30.
Pickled cucumbers, 900g jar; 31. Candy “Krowka”, 1 kg; 32. Cookies “Delicje szampanskie”,
1kg; 33. Cookies “Petit Beurre” type, 100g; 34. Pretzel sticks, 100g; 35. Halvah, 1 kg; 36.
Vinegar, 10%, 0.5l bottle; 37. Citric acid, 10g bag; 38. Tea “Madras”, packed domestically,
100g; 39. Vacuum cleaner, type 338,5; 40. Kitchen mixer, type 175,5; 41. Folding bicycle
“Wigry-3"; 42. Radio receiver “Ania” 43. Razor blade “Polsilver”, each; 44. Toothpaste
“Pollena”, 98g; 45. Shaving cream; 46. Sanitary pads “Donna”, box of 20; 47. Paint thinner, 0.5l;
48. Radiator coolant “Borygo” or “Petrygo”, 49. Mineral water in a cafeteria, 0.33l bottle; 50.
Boiled egg in a cafeteria, each; 51. Mineral water in a café, 0.33l bottle; 52. Pastry “W-Z” in a
café, each; 53. Car-wash, of car: “FSO 1500"; 54. Varnishing of hardwood floor, twice, 1m
2; 55.
ECG test; 56. Cigarettes “Popularne”, 1 pack; 57. Cigarettes “Klubowe”, 1 pack; 58. Cigarettes
“Mocne”, 1 pack.39
Appendix B. Goods by Type and Category.
Good Type Importance Search Amount Search
number of in frequency** spent on intensity**
good* expenditure** single
purchase**
Back bacon "Sopocka" 1 p 1 1 2 1
Sausage "Krakowska sucha" 2 p 1 1 2 1
Sausage "Mysliwska sucha" 3 p 1 1 2 1
Sausage "Krakowska parzona" 4 p 1 1 2 1
Sausage "Zwyczajna" 5 p 1 1 2 1
Pork wieners 6 p 1 1 2 1
Sausage "Torunska" 7 p 1 1 2 1
Sausage "Zywiecka" 8 p 1 1 2 1
Eggs 9 p 1 1 2 1
Carp, live 10 p 3 3 3 2
Herring, salted 11 p 3 2 2 2
Sprats, smoked 12 p 3 2 2 2
Cheese "Gouda" 13 p 2 1 3 1
Cheese "Edamski" 14 p 2 1 3 1
Butter, 82.5% fat 15 p 1 1 3 1
Margarine "Palma" 16 p 1 1 3 1
Veggie butter, 17 p 1 1 3 1
Rye bread 18 p 1 1 3 1
Bread "Baltonowski" 19 p 1 1 3 1
Bread "Wiejski" 20 p 1 1 3 1
Powdered baby formula 21 d 1 2 2 1
Flour "Tortowa" 22 d 2 2 3 1
Flour "Krupczatka" 23 d 2 2 3 1
Flour "Poznanska" 24 d 2 2 3 1
Pearl barley "Mazurska" 25 d 3 3 3 2
Sugar 26 d 1 2 3 1
Plum butter 27 d 2 2 3 2
Jam, blackcurrant 28 d 2 2 3 2
Apple juice 29 d 2 2 3 2
Pickled cucumbers 30 d 2 2 3 2
Candy "Krowka" 31 d 2 2 3 2
Cookies"Delicje szampanskie" 32 d 2 2 3 2
Cookies "Petit Beurre" type 33 d 2 2 3 2
Pretzel sticks 34 d 2 2 3 2
Halvah 35 d 2 2 3 3
Vinegar 36 d 2 2 3 2
Citric acid 37 d 3 3 3 3
Tea "Madras" 38 d 1 2 2 140
Appendix B continued.
Good Type Importance Search Amount Search
number of in frequency** spent on intensity**
good* expenditure** single
purchase**
Vacuum cleaner, type 338,5 39 m 3 3 1 1
Kitchen mixer, type 175,5 40 m 3 3 1 1
Folding bicycle “Wigry-3" 41 m 3 3 1 1
Radio receiver "Ania" 42 m 3 3 1 1
Razor blade "Polsilver" 43 m 3 2 3 3
Toothpaste "Pollena" 44 m 2 2 3 2
Shaving cream 45 m 3 2 3 2
Sanitary pads "Donna" 46 m 2 2 2 1
Paint thinner 47 m 3 3 3 3
Radiator coolant 48 m 3 3 3 3
Mineral water in a cafeteria 49 s 2 2 3 3
Boiled egg in a cafeteria 50 s 2 2 3 3
Mineral water in a café 51 s 2 2 3 3
Pastry "W-Z" in a café 52 s 2 2 3 3
Car-wash, of car: "FSO 1500" 53 s 2 2 2 2
Varnishing of hardwood floor 54 s 3 3 1 1
ECG test 55 s 3 3 2 3
Cigarettes "Popularne" 56 c 1 1 2 1
Cigarettes "Klubowe" 57 c 1 1 2 1
Cigarettes "Mocne" 58 c 1 1 2 1
Notes:
* p - perishable foodstuffs;
 d - durable foodstuffs;
 m - manufactured goods;
 s - services (includes goods in cafeteria/café)
 c - cigarettes.
** 1 denotes goods with highest weight in expenditure, highest search frequency, largest amount




1990 1992-96 1990 1992-96 1990-96
time mean coeff -2.449 0.115 -3.436 -0.059 0.012
median coeff -2.389 0.053 -3.002 -0.030 0.011
max coeff 5.461 1.509 6.051 0.799 0.066
min. coeff -9.152 -0.644 -13.120 -0.836 -0.039
+ve signif. * 0 17 3 12 26
-ve signif.* 26 10 35 19 5
time 
2 mean coeff 0.120 -0.001 0.176 0.001 -0.0001
median coeff 0.113 0.000 0.165 0.001 -0.0001
max coeff 0.670 0.005 0.736 0.008 0.0004
min. coeff -0.532 -0.014 -0.479 -0.007 -0.0007
+ve signif.* 23 9 32 20 5
-ve signif.* 1 18 3 11 24
R 
2 average 0.541 0.383 0.753 0.504 0.343
median 0.549 0.396 0.760 0.516 0.309
max 0.926 0.683 0.975 0.857 0.658
min 0.014 0.100 0.287 0.091 0.093
average slope -0.892 0.016 -1.155 0.004 0.0041172
Notes: 
1.   * denotes significance at the 5% level.
2. Average slope is the average first derivative with respect to time in the fitted equation.




9DOXH 9DOXH 9DOXH $YHUDJH $YHUDJH 0D[ 0RQWK 3ULFH 9DOXH 0RQWK RI 9DOXH RI
RI RI LQ LQ LQ LQ WUDQVLWLRQ FKDQJHV DW HQG RI ILUVW PD[￿ ILUVW PD[￿
RYHUDOO RYHUDOO -DQXDU\ ￿￿￿￿ \HDUV ￿￿￿￿" HQGV WR HQG RI WUDQVLWLRQ DIWHU HQG DIWHU HQG
PLQLPXP PD[LPXP ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ [  \HV WUDQVLWLRQ RI WUDQV￿ RI WUDQV￿
&ROXPQ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ D ￿￿ ￿ ￿
$YHUDJH IRU DOO JRRGV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Averages for types of goods
3HULVKDEOH IRRGVWXIIV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
’XUDEOH IRRGVWXIIV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0DQXIDFWXUHG SURGXFWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6HUYLFHV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0HDWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
’DLU\ SURGXFWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
%UHDGV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
)ORXUV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6ZHHWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
&DQQHG IUXLWV DQG YHJHWDEOHV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0DQXIDFWXUHG JRRGV ￿ ELJ LWHPV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0DQXIDFWXUHG JRRGV ￿ VPDOO LWHPV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
&DIHWHULD￿FDIp ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
2WKHU 6HUYLFHV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Averages for goods grouped by search considerations
:HLJKW LQ KLJKHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
H[SHQGLWXUH ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6HDUFK KLJKHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
IUHTXHQF\ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
$PRXQW VSHQW KLJKHVW￿LQFO￿ SURGXFW ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
RQ VLQJOH KLJKHVW￿H[FO￿ SURGXFW ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
SXUFKDVH ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6HDUFK KLJKHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
LQWHQVLW\ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Individual goods
￿ %DFN EDFRQ ￿6RSRFND￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿.UDNRZVND VXFKD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿0\VOLZVND VXFKD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ R ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿.UDNRZVND SDU]RQD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿=Z\F]DMQD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ R ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 3RUN ZLHQHUV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ R ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿7RUXQVND￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿=\ZLHFND￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ R ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿43
7DEOH ￿D FRQWLQXHG
Value Value Value Average Average Max Month Price Value Month of Value of 
of of in in in  in transition changes at end of first max. first max.
overall overall January 1990 years 1/90? ends to end of transition after end  after end 
minimum maximum 1990 1992-96 x =yes transition of trans. of trans.
Column 1234567 7 a 89 1 0
9 Eggs 0.054 0.236 0.236 0.098 0.088 x 8 17.40 0.061 9 0.069
10 Carp, live 0.031 0.202 0.107 0.074 0.093 o 4 4.13 0.059 7 0.116
11 Herring, salted 0.056 0.176 0.176 0.106 0.082 x 6 5.37 0.080 7 0.118
12 Sprats, smoked 0.038 0.248 0.091 0.110 0.096 o 5 6.31 0.038 7 0.136
13 Cheese "Gouda" 0.042 0.175 0.175 0.089 0.070 x 9 9.70 0.047 11 0.082
14 Cheese "Edamski" 0.046 0.139 0.117 0.093 0.069 o 7 5.23 0.064 9 0.079
15 Butter, 82.5% fat 0.040 0.163 0.163 0.081 0.059 x 4 4.77 0.055 6 0.071
16 0DUJDULQH ￿3DOPD￿ 0.041 0.201 0.201 0.082 0.062 x 6 4.25 0.053 8 0.076
17 9HJJLH EXWWHU￿ 0.042 0.263 0.132 0.099 0.076 o 5 5.16 0.063 7 0.081
18 5\H EUHDG 0.104 0.313 0.313 0.167 0.212 x 2 1.93 0.137 3 0.233
19 %UHDG ￿%DOWRQRZVNL￿ 0.056 0.223 0.223 0.106 0.102 x 5 4.39 0.079 7 0.101
20 %UHDG ￿:LHMVNL￿ 0.079 0.399 0.399 0.137 0.145 x 4 3.34 0.099 7 0.137
21 3RZGHUHG EDE\ IRUPXOD 0.052 0.179 0.113 0.113 0.074 o 10 7.46 0.068 12 0.117
22 )ORXU ￿7RUWRZD￿ 0.053 0.203 0.203 0.140 0.072 x 7 2.54 0.080 9 0.140
23 )ORXU ￿.UXSF]DWND￿ 0.050 0.278 0.119 0.151 0.075 o 22 7.65 0.068 23 0.078
24 )ORXU ￿3R]QDQVND￿ 0.050 0.206 0.102 0.120 0.075 o 12 7.22 0.069 15 0.087
25 3HDUO EDUOH\ ￿0D]XUVND￿ 0.067 0.312 0.170 0.190 0.104 o 8 3.96 0.098 11 0.127
26 6XJDU 0.039 0.211 0.211 0.084 0.080 x 8 6.28 0.048 10 0.066
27 3OXP EXWWHU 0.088 0.230 0.230 0.168 0.129 x 7 5.17 0.113 9 0.144
28 -DP￿ EODFNFXUUDQW 0.096 0.248 0.184 0.177 0.134 o 8 4.61 0.139 9 0.134
29 $SSOH MXLFH 0.057 0.225 0.116 0.114 0.101 o 5 3.04 0.061 6 0.137
30 3LFNOHG FXFXPEHUV 0.074 0.324 0.270 0.185 0.106 o 2 0.88 0.160 3 0.212
31 &DQG\ ￿.URZND￿ 0.073 0.246 0.207 0.159 0.117 o 10 12.15 0.083 12 0.158
32 &RRNLHV￿’HOLFMH V]DPSDQVNLH￿ 0.067 0.204 0.204 0.107 0.112 x 4 2.92 0.074 5 0.087
33 &RRNLHV ￿3HWLW %HXUUH￿ W\SH 0.092 0.355 0.174 0.162 0.147 o 4 1.84 0.136 6 0.169
34 3UHW]HO VWLFNV 0.097 0.230 0.150 0.153 0.131 o 4 4.98 0.127 6 0.176
35 +DOYDK 0.072 0.351 0.123 0.196 0.118 o 10 6.53 0.072 11 0.121
36 9LQHJDU 0.087 0.295 0.221 0.206 0.119 o 13 9.29 0.114 14 0.128
37 &LWULF DFLG 0.193 0.891 0.888 0.549 0.278 o 11 4.54 0.210 13 0.476
38 7HD ￿0DGUDV￿ 0.061 0.176 0.080 0.095 0.124 o 1 0.080 2 0.141
39 9DFXXP FOHDQHU 0.035 0.225 0.225 0.109 0.080 x 10 2.08 0.035 13 0.122
40 .LWFKHQ PL[HU 0.036 0.139 0.138 0.075 0.085 o 5 1.28 0.047 6 0.056
41 )ROGLQJ ELF\FOH 0.042 0.170 0.170 0.104 0.088 x 6 1.01 0.076 7 0.122
42 5DGLR UHFHLYHU ￿$QLD￿ 0.037 0.245 0.245 0.139 0.102 x 6 0.27 0.074 8 0.113
43 5D]RU EODGH ￿3ROVLOYHU￿ 0.122 0.516 0.122 0.286 0.234 o 9 1.10 0.153 11 0.194
44 7RRWKSDVWH ￿3ROOHQD￿ 0.097 0.578 0.342 0.376 0.179 o 17 5.59 0.161 21 0.205
45 6KDYLQJ FUHDP 0.082 0.624 0.474 0.480 0.165 o 21 7.17 0.108 24 0.183
46 6DQLWDU\ SDGV ￿’RQQD￿ 0.047 0.327 0.118 0.183 0.104 o 17 4.18 0.071 18 0.134
47 3DLQW WKLQQHU 0.133 0.445 0.312 0.246 0.182 o 6 2.57 0.145 8 0.197
48 5DGLDWRU FRRODQW 0.044 0.643 0.643 0.229 0.104 x 2 0.74 0.113 4 0.213
49 0LQHUDO ZDWHU LQ D FDIHWHULD 0.049 0.306 0.774 0.287 0.181 x 10 1.97 0.104 11 0.285
50 %RLOHG HJJ LQ D FDIHWHULD 0.084 0.386 0.234 0.215 0.189 o 6 3.90 0.169 7 0.164
51 0LQHUDO ZDWHU LQ D FDIH 0.203 0.759 0.445 0.300 0.364 o 5 1.06 0.204 6 0.233
52 3DVWU\ ￿:￿=￿ LQ D FDIH 0.215 0.443 0.358 0.283 0.307 o 2 1.07 0.217 4 0.322
53 &DU￿ZDVK￿ RI FDU￿ ￿)62 ￿￿￿￿￿ 0.233 0.514 0.514 0.364 0.346 x 3 0.60 0.238 5 0.374
54 9DUQLVKLQJ RI KDUGZRRG IORRU 0.095 0.517 0.505 0.352 0.399 o 4 0.30 0.256 7 0.442
55 (&* WHVW 0.069 0.429 0.239 0.161 0.326 o 2 0.55 0.080 5 0.20344
7DEOHE
,QWHUPDUNHW3ULFH'LVSHUVLRQ
9DOXH 9DOXH 9DOXH $YHUDJH $YHUDJH 0D[ 0RQWK 9DOXH 0RQWK RI 9DOXH RI
RI RI LQ LQ LQ LQ WUDQVLWLRQ DW HQG RI ILUVW PD[￿ ILUVW PD[￿
RYHUDOO RYHUDOO -DQXDU\ ￿￿￿￿ \HDUV ￿￿￿￿" HQGV WUDQVLWLRQ DIWHU HQG DIWHU HQG
PLQLPXP PD[LPXP ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ [  \HV RI WUDQV￿ RI WUDQV￿
&ROXPQ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
$YHUDJH IRU DOO JRRGV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Averages for types of goods
3HULVKDEOH IRRGVWXIIV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
’XUDEOH IRRGVWXIIV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0DQXIDFWXUHG SURGXFWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6HUYLFHV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0HDWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
’DLU\ 3URGXFWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
%UHDGV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
)ORXUV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6ZHHWV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
&DQQHG IUXLWV DQG YHJHWDEOHV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0DQXIDFWXUHG JRRGV ￿ ELJ LWHPV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
0DQXIDFWXUHG JRRGV ￿ VPDOO LWHPV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
&DIHWHULD￿FDIp ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
2WKHU 6HUYLFHV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Averages for goods grouped by search considerations
:HLJKW LQ KLJKHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
H[SHQGLWXUH ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6HDUFK KLJKHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
IUHTXHQF\ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
$PRXQW VSHQW KLJKHVW￿LQFO￿ SURGXFW ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
RQ VLQJOH KLJKHVW￿H[FO￿ SURGXFW ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
SXUFKDVH ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
6HDUFK KLJKHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
LQWHQVLW\ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
ORZHVW ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Individual goods
￿ %DFN EDFRQ ￿6RSRFND￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿.UDNRZVND VXFKD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿0\VOLZVND VXFKD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿.UDNRZVND SDU]RQD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿=Z\F]DMQD￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 3RUN ZLHQHUV ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿7RUXQVND￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ 6DXVDJH ￿=\ZLHFND￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ [ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿45
7DEOHEFRQWLQXHG
Value Value Value Average Average Max Month Value Month of Value of 
of of in in in  in transition at end of first max. first max.
overall overall January 1990 years 1/90? ends transition after end  after end 
minimum maximum 1990 1992-96 x =yes of trans. of trans.
Column 123456789 1 0
9 Eggs 0.036 0.104 0.099 0.070 0.059 o 9 0.052 11 0.074
10 Carp, live 0.051 0.218 0.179 0.147 0.085 o 12 0.072 13 0.091
11 Herring, salted 0.049 0.128 0.125 0.093 0.059 o 12 0.049 14 0.061
12 Sprats, smoked 0.046 0.213 0.190 0.155 0.067 o 15 0.070 16 0.066
13 Cheese "Gouda" 0.030 0.177 0.177 0.087 0.042 x 8 0.054 12 0.065
14 Cheese "Edamski" 0.030 0.182 0.182 0.089 0.043 x 15 0.052 16 0.052
15 Butter, 82.5% fat 0.037 0.164 0.164 0.069 0.051 x 4 0.053 5 0.068
16 0DUJDULQH ￿3DOPD￿ 0.025 0.259 0.259 0.078 0.043 x 11 0.032 14 0.048
17 9HJJLH EXWWHU￿ 0.040 0.369 0.369 0.115 0.063 x 16 0.046 17 0.049
18 5\H EUHDG 0.112 0.206 0.206 0.149 0.148 x 7 0.130 9 0.147
19 %UHDG ￿%DOWRQRZVNL￿ 0.075 0.216 0.216 0.112 0.096 x 7 0.076 9 0.100
20 %UHDG ￿:LHMVNL￿ 0.092 0.293 0.293 0.124 0.134 x 7 0.096 9 0.113
21 3RZGHUHG EDE\ IRUPXOD 0.028 0.153 0.125 0.082 0.038 o 10 0.043 12 0.062
22 )ORXU ￿7RUWRZD￿ 0.033 0.335 0.335 0.118 0.042 x 27 0.033 32 0.065
23 )ORXU ￿.UXSF]DWND￿ 0.034 0.334 0.334 0.122 0.048 x 15 0.051 17 0.059
24 )ORXU ￿3R]QDQVND￿ 0.036 0.327 0.327 0.113 0.050 x 14 0.039 18 0.055
25 3HDUO EDUOH\ ￿0D]XUVND￿ 0.044 0.358 0.334 0.186 0.071 o 14 0.082 15 0.095
26 6XJDU 0.026 0.099 0.099 0.053 0.035 x 13 0.029 14 0.030
27 3OXP EXWWHU 0.050 0.186 0.184 0.121 0.078 o 7 0.083 9 0.088
28 -DP￿ EODFNFXUUDQW 0.053 0.212 0.187 0.141 0.073 o 6 0.104 12 0.168
29 $SSOH MXLFH 0.039 0.423 0.423 0.190 0.061 x 8 0.101 11 0.142
30 3LFNOHG FXFXPEHUV 0.042 0.300 0.260 0.162 0.063 o 18 0.042 21 0.061
31 &DQG\ ￿.URZND￿ 0.050 0.154 0.118 0.091 0.066 o 11 0.059 12 0.060
32 &RRNLHV￿’HOLFMH V]DPSDQVNLH￿ 0.058 0.192 0.192 0.098 0.087 x 6 0.070 7 0.087
33 &RRNLHV ￿3HWLW %HXUUH￿ W\SH 0.037 0.221 0.221 0.098 0.077 x 10 0.058 12 0.069
34 3UHW]HO VWLFNV 0.076 0.172 0.114 0.121 0.100 o 7 0.096 11 0.131
35 +DOYDK 0.056 0.424 0.259 0.229 0.091 o 11 0.062 13 0.070
36 9LQHJDU 0.050 0.271 0.245 0.172 0.067 o 8 0.091 9 0.130
37 &LWULF DFLG 0.134 0.652 0.618 0.531 0.216 o 32 0.146 36 0.194
38 7HD ￿0DGUDV￿ 0.056 0.232 0.151 0.100 0.078 o 9 0.065 11 0.071
39 9DFXXP FOHDQHU 0.027 0.389 0.389 0.153 0.046 x 16 0.073 21 0.097
40 .LWFKHQ PL[HU 0.026 0.508 0.508 0.157 0.048 x 5 0.074 9 0.123
41 )ROGLQJ ELF\FOH 0.042 0.253 0.253 0.092 0.054 x 5 0.063 7 0.075
42 5DGLR UHFHLYHU ￿$QLD￿ 0.040 0.239 0.239 0.127 0.070 x 9 0.092 12 0.161
43 5D]RU EODGH ￿3ROVLOYHU￿ 0.091 0.521 0.299 0.219 0.154 o 13 0.091 16 0.121
44 7RRWKSDVWH ￿3ROOHQD￿ 0.069 0.552 0.318 0.310 0.100 o 21 0.083 23 0.092
45 6KDYLQJ FUHDP 0.041 0.453 0.278 0.394 0.114 o 19 0.138 21 0.174
46 6DQLWDU\ SDGV ￿’RQQD￿ 0.049 0.198 0.198 0.138 0.069 x 26 0.049 27 0.054
47 3DLQW WKLQQHU 0.088 0.313 0.308 0.163 0.106 o 8 0.110 9 0.118
48 5DGLDWRU FRRODQW 0.062 0.313 0.313 0.162 0.117 x 4 0.114 8 0.141
49 0LQHUDO ZDWHU LQ D FDIHWHULD 0.158 0.500 0.379 0.294 0.260 o 7 0.222 8 0.215
50 %RLOHG HJJ LQ D FDIHWHULD 0.128 0.306 0.176 0.173 0.203 o 7 0.130 12 0.197
51 0LQHUDO ZDWHU LQ D FDIH 0.199 0.399 0.319 0.258 0.312 o 6 0.201 8 0.238
52 3DVWU\ ￿:￿=￿ LQ D FDIH 0.215 0.499 0.400 0.317 0.288 o 5 0.259 9 0.335
53 &DU￿ZDVK￿ RI FDU￿ ￿)62 ￿￿￿￿￿ 0.161 0.508 0.508 0.353 0.221 x 5 0.311 7 0.359
54 9DUQLVKLQJ RI KDUGZRRG IORRU 0.243 0.616 0.616 0.382 0.383 x 4 0.277 7 0.474
55 (&* WHVW 0.239 0.916 0.916 0.407 0.401 x 5 0.256 7 0.53146
Table 3.
3HULRG ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
&3, PHDQ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
2ZQ PHDQ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
LQIODWLRQ ￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
,QIODWLRQ PHDQ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
YDULDELOLW\ ￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
WLPH PHDQ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
PHGLDQ FRHII ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
PD[￿ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
PLQ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
WLPH
￿ PHDQ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
PHGLDQ FRHII ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
PD[￿ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
PLQ FRHII￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
$YH VORSH PHDQ FRHII ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿YH VLJQLI￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
5
￿ DYHUDJH ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
PHGLDQ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
PD[LPXP ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
PLQLPXP ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Notes: 
1.   * denotes significance at the 5% level.
2.     Average slope is the average first derivative with respect to time in the fitted equation.
’LVSHUVLRQ ’LVSHUVLRQ ’LVSHUVLRQ ’LVSHUVLRQ
,QWUDPDUNHW ,QWHUPDUNHW ,QWUDPDUNHW ,QWHUPDUNHW47
Weight in Search Amount Search
expenditure frequency spent intensity
on single
purchase
Weight in expenditure 1 0.86 -0.12 0.52
Search frequency 0.86 1 -0.19 0.47
Amount spent on single purchase -0.12 -0.19 1 0.43
Search intensity 0.52 0.47 0.43 1
&RUUHODWLRQV %HWZHHQ 6HDUFK ,QGLFDWRUV￿
7DEOH ￿￿￿
Figure 1
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(DFK OLQH VKRZV WKH SHUFHQWDJH RI REVHUYDWLRQV ZKLFK DUH DW OHDVW WKH JLYHQ DPRXQW DZD\ IURP WKH DYHUDJH SULFH￿
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Figure 7
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Figure 8
Average Intra- and Intermarket Price Dispersion Controlled for Inflation, Inflation Variability, 
Seasonal Effects and Differences in Levels Across Goods.
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Figure 9a
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Figure 9b
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All goods Durable goods Perishable goods